Why Tolerate Conscience?

In Why Tolerate Religion?, Brian Leiter argues against the special legal status of religion, claiming that religion should not be the only ground for exemptions to the law and that this form of protection should be, in principle, available for the claims of secular conscience as well. However, in the last chapter of his book, he objects to a universal regime of exemptions for both religious and secular claims of conscience, highlighting the practical and moral flaws associated with it. We believe that Leiter identifies a genuine and important contemporary legal and philosophical problem. We find much to admire in his reasoning. However, we raise questions about two claims that are crucial for his argument. The first claim is that it is not religion as such, but conscience that deserves toleration and respect. The second claim is that respect for religion and conscience demands ‘principled toleration’ but does not entail stronger policies of legal exemptions. Against the first claim, we argue that Leiter does not successfully distinguish religious belief from secular conscience and morality; and he does not explain why secular conscience (which shares many of religious conscience’s epistemic features) deserves respect. Against the second claim, we argue that the most promising theories of legal exemptions are not classical theories of liberal toleration.     

Theories of Criminalization

In this article, I comment on Simester and von Hirsch’s theory of criminalization and discuss general principles of criminalization. After some brief comments on punishment theories and the role of moral wrongdoing, I examine main lines of contemporary criminalization theories which tend to focus on the issues of harm, offense, paternalism and side-constraints. One of the points of disagreement with Simester and von Hirsch concerns the role of the harm principle. I rely on a straightforward normative concept of “rights of others,” not in the sense of rights granted in positive law but in the sense of rights which are to be justified in political philosophy. With a rights-centered rather than a harm-centered approach, a prima facie reason for criminalization is the violation of others’ rights. It is unnecessary to develop a separate category of “offense to others,” and paternalistic interventions can be criticized straightforwardly because rights can be waived.     

The Criminal Trial,the Rule of Law and the Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence

If the criminal trial is aimed simply at ascertaining the truth of a criminal charge, it is inherently problematic to prevent the prosecution from adducing relevant evidence on the ground of its unlawful provenance. This article challenges the starting premise by replacing the epistemic focus with a political perspective. It offers a normative justification for the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence that is rooted in a theory of the criminal trial as a process of holding the executive to the rule of law. On this theory, it is the admission rather than exclusion of such evidence that is inherently problematic. The differences between this theory and others that are in currency will be noted, as will its implications and limitations.     

Responsibility and the Limits of Conversation

Both legal and moral theorists have offered broadly “communicative” theories of criminal and moral responsibility. According to such accounts, we can understand the nature of responsibility by appealing to the idea that responsibility practices are in some fundamental sense expressive, discursive, or communicative. In this essay, I consider a variety of issues in connections with this family of views, including its relationship to free will, the theory of exemptions, and potential alternatives to the communicative model. Focusing on Michael McKenna’s Conversation and Responsibility, I argue that communicative accounts, and the conversational model in particular, direct our attention to important and under-appreciated elements of our responsibility practices. However, rather than focusing on a model of conversation-as-address, as McKenna does, we do better to regard gossip as the paradigmatic conversational form that captures the main features of moral responsibility.     

The Relevance of Intention to Criminal Wrongdoing

In this paper, we defend the general thesis that intentions are relevant not only to moral permissibility and impermissibility, but also to criminal wrongdoing, as well as a specific version of the Doctrine of Double Effect that we believe can help solve some challenging puzzles in the criminal law. We begin by answering some recent arguments that marginalize or eliminate the role of intentions as components of criminal wrongdoing [e.g., Alexander and Ferzan (Crime and culpability: a theory of criminal law. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009), Chiao (Crim Law Philos 4:37–55, 2010), Walen (Crim Law Philos 3:71–78, 2009)]. We then turn to some influential theories that articulate a direct role for intentions [e.g., Duff (Answering for crime: responsibility and liability in the criminal law. Hart Publishing, Portland, 2007), Husak (Crim Law Philos 3:51–70, 2009)]. While we endorse the commitment to such a role for intentions, we believe that extant theories have not yet been able to adequately address certain objections or solve certain puzzles, such as that some attempt convictions require criminal intent when the crime attempted, if successful, requires only foresight, and that some intended harms appear to be no more serious than non-intended ones of the same magnitude, for example. Drawing on a variety of resources, including the specific version of the Doctrine of Double Effect we have developed in recent published work, we present solutions to these puzzles, which in turn provide mutual support for our general approach to the role of intentions and for thinking that using others as means is itself a special kind of wrongdoing.     

Sexual Harassment Litigation: a Road to Re-victimization or Recovery?

Various aspects of the judicial process have been hypothesized as damaging to sexual harassment plaintiffs, though limited research has been conducted that actually examines this hypothesis. We examined data from a large sample of women who participated in a class action lawsuit alleging workplace sexual harassment and discrimination (n?=?1218) and another sample of similarly situated women who opted out of litigation (n?=?465, non-litigants). We then followed the litigants for 5 years. This study takes an initial look at some of the variables theorized to play a role in the psychological outcomes of both harassment and subsequent litigation. Both the severity of harassment and participation/persistence in the litigation process were related to psychological outcomes at each of three assessments across a 5-year period; the frequency and severity of harassment, as well as plaintiffs’ cognitive appraisals of their situation, appeared to have the strongest relationship to psychological harm. Results of multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) revealed that participation and persistence in litigation played a consistent role in psychological outcomes across time, over and above the impact of harassment itself. However, litigation did not appear to be the cause of psychological outcomes as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptomatology, in particular, was the result of the original harassment experience.     

Neuropsychological,Psychological, and Vocational Assessment of High Achievers in a Medicolegal Context

High achievers are a unique subset of persons referred for neuropsychological and psychological assessments in medicolegal contexts, including personal injury, disability, and workers’ compensation cases. Literature in this area is limited and poorly integrated, and neither a conceptual model nor best evidence-informed practices for the assessment of high achievers in the medicolegal context have yet emerged. Construct and methodological issues also hamper the ability of assessors to accurately and fairly assess this specialist group, which is particularly troubling in high-stakes forensic assessments. This paper reviews the current methodological issues involved in the assessment of high achievers and proposes an integrated, multimethod assessment model based on a particular vocational group, namely that of business leaders and entrepreneurs, that draws from available empirical research in different fields of psychological inquiry.